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Abstract 
This paper reviews the literature on institutions and explores the ways in which institutions 
can influence economic growth, with a particular focus on how institutions affect the use 
that firms make of human capital to improve their productivity.  It discusses the influence 
of underlying institutions, such as law and order and secure property rights, on the general 
environment within which the economic activities of production and exchange takes place.  
It also explores the influence of activity-specific institutions, such as labour market 
institutions, on firm decisions about resource use and innovation and through these on 
economic activity and economic growth. 
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Institutions, firms and economic 
growth 
1 Introduction 
Institutions include all the formal and informal conventions that shape the political, 
economic and social behaviour of the members of a society.  They encompass not only 
basic institutions such as social norms and the rule of law, but also more specific 
institutions such as governance arrangements for entities such as firms, and regulations 
applying to various markets (IMF 2003).  Political and economic institutions are underlying 
determinants of the incentive structure and economic performance of a society (North 
1990, 1994). 
Institutions based on first order economic principles (such as the protection of property 
rights, competition, and appropriate incentives) underpin long run economic growth 
(Rodrik 2003).  While it is possible for such economic principles to be reflected in many 
different types of institution across countries, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
quality of economic institutions affects the level of GDP per capita, the growth of GDP per 
capita and the volatility of growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Easterly and 
Levine 2003, Hall and Jones 1999, New Zealand Treasury 2004, Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi 2004).  The evidence suggests that the quality of institutions has a robust and 
significant indirect relationship to growth via its effect on the volume of investment.  In 
particular, better quality institutions reduce red tape and rent-seeking activities and (more 
weakly) improve the efficiency of investment by enforcing well-defined property rights 
(Aron 2000).   
One route through which institutions can influence economic growth is through their 
effects on firms and the efficiency with which they operate.  Institutions, such as property 
rights and contract law, shape the regulatory and economic environment within which 
firms operate.  They also influence the firm’s internal decisions and its productivity.   
Financial market regulation, for example, can affect the availability and price of capital 
while intellectual property regulation can affect the design and price of products.   
Institutions also affect firms’ decisions on their use of inputs, including human capital.  
Labour market regulation designed to protect workers can encourage investment in the 
human capital of workers but can also reduce the incentives for firms to hire new workers. 
Institutions and the ways they can affect economic activity are described in section 2 of 
the paper.  The fundamental social, political and economic institutions that underlie all 
relationships are discussed in section 3.  The remainder of the paper covers institutions 
that are specific to particular activities of firms.  Section 4 describes how these institutions 
can affect firm decisions and productivity.  Sections 5 and 6 describe the key institutions  
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and discuss their implications for human capital and firm productivity.  Conclusions are 
drawn in section 7.   
2  Institutions and economic activity 
Institutions encompass formal rules such as laws and regulations and informal 
conventions such as mores and customs.  These conventions shape the behaviour of 
members of a society as well as expectations about behaviour.  They determine the types 
of activities that are encouraged or prohibited as well as the rewards and sanctions 
associated with undertaking these activities.  Institutions govern activities in all spheres of 
society, including economic activity.  North (1991) suggests that institutions provide the 
incentive structure of an economy and that, as the structure evolves, it shapes the 
direction of economic growth towards growth, stagnation or decline.   
2.1  Geography, policies and institutions 
Three underlying forces that are thought to drive a country’s economic growth: its 
geography; its economic policies; and its institutions.  There is debate about the relative 
importance of each in terms of their contribution to economic growth, but there is general 
agreement that well performing institutions are associated with economic growth.   
Geography affects the potential of a country to grow through its location relative to other 
countries and its endowment of natural resources.  Easterly (2003) notes that theories on 
a country’s geography/endowments suggest that the environment directly influences the 
quality of land, labour and production technologies.  Geographical features may also limit 
a country’s opportunities for accessing large economic market, such as, in New Zealand’s 
case, its distance from its markets. 
The economic policy view does not consider historical legacies to be particularly 
important, believing that historical settings can be easily reversed.  It emphasises current 
knowledge about economic development and political forces rather than history or factor 
endowments.  This view holds that sound macroeconomic policies, openness to 
international trade and the absence of capital account controls will tend to foster long-run 
economic success. 
Proponents of the importance of institutions hold that the formal and informal practices 
that a country has developed to guide interactions between the members of a society 
affect the ease with which economic activity can take place.  Institutions that are seen to 
support a country’s economic development include institutions that protect private 
property rights and the operation of the rule of law, lead to low levels of corruption and 
facilitate all private interactions rather than protect a small elite.   
The broad environment (including factor endowments, social arrangements and colonial 
power) has powerful effects on the sorts of institutions that evolve.  Historically, 
geographic characteristics have often had an impact on the nature of a country’s 
institutions.  Countries with hospitable climates often led to settlement by colonists and 
attendant institutions that supported the economic development of a country (Easterly and 
Levine 2003).  Countries that were less geographically hospitable instead tended to see 
“extractive” institutions implemented that supported the removal of economic resources 
from the country to the colonial power.  The quality of a country’s institutions, as 
introduced by European colonisers, tended to be lasting or exploitative depending on the  
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suitability of the country for European settlement (as measured by mortality rates) 
(Acemoglu et al 2001).  A study by Engerman and Sokoloff (2003) found that geography 
seems to have played a greater role in determining the institutions adopted by colony 
countries than the particular country they were colonised by.   
In considering the effects of geography, Easterly and Levine (2003) conclude that 
geography/endowments explain cross-country differences in economic development but 
only through their impact on institutions.  Policies do not explain cross country differences 
once the impact of endowments on institutions and on economic development have been 
controlled for.  Thus, correcting bad policies without correcting the institutions will bring 
little long-run benefit. 
The IMF (2003)
1
 notes that there are important interactions between institutions and 
economic policies, with the quality of institutions influencing the strength and sustainability 
of policies and vice versa.  The interplay between these two drivers is important for 
economic growth but it makes it difficult to identify their individual contributions.   
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi  (2002) found that the quality of institutions is most 
important in driving economic growth, with geography and policy having, respectively, 
weak and negative effects on economic growth.  Sachs (2003) disagrees in regard to 
geography.  He notes the direct effects of geography on production systems, human 
health and environmental sustainability and looks specifically at the relationship between 
the prevalence of malaria and GNP per capita.  He concludes that “there is good 
theoretical and empirical reason to believe that the development process reflects a 
complex interaction of institutions, policies and geography.” (2003: 9).  
2.2  Firms and institutions 
There are four principal categories of institutions that shape the economic activity of firms 
(Williamson 2000).  They are conventions in the social environment such as customs, 
norms, and social networks; formal institutions such as the polity, judiciary, bureaucracy; 
the “rules of the game”, especially those related to property; institutions governing the 
“play of the game” such as transactions between firms and the governance of 
transactions, especially contracts; and institutions related to resource allocation and 
employment within firms.   
Both formal and informal institutions provide the underlying environment in which 
economic activity takes place.  The effect they have is broad, affecting all aspects of 
economic activity, and long term, as they change very slowly.  By shaping the 
environment for economic activity, these institutions influence the level of income a 
country can attain.   
Specific institutions govern the activities carried out by firms in the course of producing 
output and engaging in transactions with others.  The institutions associated with these 
activities affect firm decisions about using resources and undertaking transactions.  These 
introduce structure into the operation of markets in order to improve the way in which they 
function.  Institutions at these levels directly affect economic activity and therefore 
economic growth. 
                                                                 
1 This study covers 94 countries split into 25 advanced countries and 69 developing countries.  It shows that advanced countries still 
stand to gain higher incomes from improvements in institutional settings.  While the magnitude of the increase is less than that which 
could be achieved by developing countries, it would nonetheless reflect an increase in real GDP per capita of roughly 40%.  See p106-
107 IMF (2003).  
This paper considers in turn the underlying institutional environment, institutions affecting 
firm resource allocation decisions and institutions influencing firm decisions about entering 
into transactions.  The relationship between institutions and firms are illustrated in Figure 
1. 
Figure 1 – Institutions and economic activity 
 
Institutional environment: social and formal institutions 






















3 Underlying  institutions 
The underlying social environment and formal institutions determine the fundamental 
conditions that operate in a country, affecting all facets of business.  The social 
environment can shape attitudes towards economic activity, while underlying formal 
institutions can influence the incentives for investment and exchange. 
3.1 Social  environment 
The social environment includes the values, customs, norms, culture and social networks 
that exist in a society.  These factors are often cultural, religious or moral in origin and as 
a result are generally longstanding.  The social environment can influence the informal 
rewards and sanctions associated with different behaviours.  They can influence 
economic activity through affecting the aspirations that individuals hold and the attitudes 
firms take towards risk.  Factors affecting social relationships, such as trust, provide the 
basis on which parties can expect to interact (Klein 1997, Offer 1997).   
All behaviour, including economic action, takes place in a network of interpersonal 
relations.  Firms operate in markets where information is exchanged through the price 
mechanism.  Any exchange, however, depends greatly on trust.  There is a strong 
relationship between the general level of trust and economic activity within a society.  If 
people did not trust one another, economic activity would be greatly impeded as firms use 
more costly methods (sometimes illegal) to ensure exchange.  Trust can thus both reduce 
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the transaction costs of exchange and ease the burden on the formal institutional system 
(New Zealand Treasury 2001).  
Granovetter (1985) suggests that the density of networks of social relations amongst 
business people affects the types of business relationships and activities they undertake.  
Economic actors avoid malfeasance most effectively by dealing with those they trust.   
That trust is produced and maintained by social relations, and formal institutions or 
sanctions that provide assurances against malfeasance are rarely used.  In repeated 
transactions it is reputation, rather than the impersonal legal system, that ensures 
individuals will deal honestly with one another (Ellickson 1986, 1991).  In a wide variety of 
situations, people not only succeed in resolving their conflicts without recourse to law, 
they do it by informal mechanisms that work considerably better than the formal legal 
system. 
The social environment influences the accumulation of human capital in a number of 
ways.  It can influence the value placed on acquiring education and training, the extent to 
which knowledge is transferred between people and the ability of individuals to adopt new 
technology.  People’s social environment (consisting of their family, friends, 
neighbourhood and colleagues) largely determines their abilities to adopt new knowledge 
(Delsen and Schonewille 1999). 
An individual’s relationships with friends, family and acquaintances and associated norms 
of reciprocity can be viewed as an asset, social capital, that has value both for the people 
in the network and often for those outside it (Putnam 2000).  It can be called on in a crisis, 
enjoyed for its own sake and/or leveraged for material gain but may also involve costs 
such as nepotism and peer pressure (Woolcock 2001). 
Social capital can contribute to economic growth by making it easier to create new 
knowledge (ie, augment human capital) and to transmit ideas and information, particularly 
information that is tacit (Grafton, Kompas and Owen 2003).  The greater the degree of 
interchange between social groups the more adaptable, resilient and productive the 
community is likely to be.  Social barriers that inhibit communication between groups will 
tend to raise the costs of interchange of knowledge and ideas, and lessen the ability of the 
society to withstand adverse shocks.  Rodrik (1999) suggests that countries with low 
levels of social conflict and with institutions that are able to mediate social conflicts 
experience more resilient economic growth than countries with weak institutions of conflict 
management.
2
  At the same time, the level and type of social capital in a community can 
be influenced by existing formal institutions and the role of government, influencing the 
contribution social capital can make to economic growth (Woolcock 2001).   
The institutional setting both underpins the development of social relationships such as 
trust, and is formed in the context of the social relationship between people.  Values, 
customs, norms and culture influence both the nature and effectiveness of formal 
institutions.  Formal institutions are most effective when they reflect what is seen to be 
appropriate behaviour and are well adapted to the underlying culture and ethics of a 
society (Haucap 1998).  As a result, institutions that are effective in one country do not 
always translate well in another.  In particular, picking up institutional arrangements that 
work in one country and applying them in another will not necessarily lead to economic 
growth (IMF 2003). 
                                                                 
2 Rodrik uses indicators of income inequality and ethnic fragmentation to proxy social conflict and indicators of the quality of 
governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic rights and social safety nets to proxy the strength of institutions of conflict 
management.  
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Social cohesion, the commitment of members of a society to its institutional 
arrangements, is also promoted when formal institutions reflect social norms (Petrie 
2002).  A particular set of values, customs and norms are not necessarily held by all 
members of a society, particularly where distinctive groups exist within the society.  For 
example, different ethnic groups within a society may operate with different social 
structures.  Petrie points out that norms can be established by a dominant group as a 
means of promoting behaviour that serves their interests.  Where formal institutions align 
more with the social conventions of one group than with those of other groups, broad 
social cohesion will be more difficult to achieve. 
A country’s formal institutions reflect its social institutions, its history and other factors 
peculiar to that country.  Differences in what is valued by countries will thus lead to variety 
in institutions.  Very different institutional settings, even where they reflect first order 
economic principles such as security of property rights, can be reasonable substitutes for 
each other and there are no particular institutions, narrowly defined, that are 
indispensable for economic growth (Engerman and Sokoloff 2003).  At the same time, 
institutions are not the only factor important for growth – countries with similar institutions 
can do quite differently in any given time period (Freeman 2000).  
As well as determining the underlying social context within which economic activity takes 
place, the social environment can also have more direct effects on firms.  They can 
influence transaction costs through reducing search costs (through social capital) and 
monitoring costs (through trust) (Rupasingha, Goetz and Freshwater 2000) and shaping 
firm attitudes towards risk taking and uncertainty (Baptista 2004) and entrepreneurship 
(Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven 2004).  They can influence the level of innovation taking 
place in firms by encouraging the diffusion of knowledge and best practice between firms 
(through social capital) (New Zealand Treasury 2001).  Culture and values can also 
influence the degree to which a country regulates economic activity, for example 
controlling new firm entry, and therefore the investment opportunities available to firms 
(Baptista 2004). 
3.2 Formal  institutions 
Formal institutions, both underlying and specific, provide the context within which firms 
operate.  Property rights and contract enforcement can be seen as “market creating” 
institutions, without which exchange cannot occur (Rodrik 2003).   
Underlying institutions such as the constitution and rule of law contribute to political 
stability, prevent corruption, enhance public sector efficiency and protect private property 
rights from misappropriation by private parties or government.
3
  More specific institutions 
include legislation and regulations and organisations that create and enforce them, such 
as government agencies and the legal system.   
Formal institutions become more important, relative to informal institutions, the more the 
scope for market exchange broadens and deepens, possibly because establishing formal 
institutions has high fixed costs but low marginal costs while informal institutions involve 
high marginal costs (Rodrik 2003).  Increased specialisation and the division of labour 
may also make formalising political, judicial and economic rules worthwhile (Aron 2000). 
Societies with weak institutions not only grow more slowly in the long run, but experience 
greater volatility (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen 2003).  Strong 
                                                                 
3 See Aron (2000) for a survey of measures of underlying political, social and economic institutions.  
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institutions are associated with high levels of real per capita income since they shape 
overall conditions for investment and growth (IMF 2003).  For example, where corruption 
and appropriation of private property are common, the potential returns on investments 
are reduced and possibly eliminated altogether.  Political control of resources may also 
limit the extent to which firms can secure the inputs they need for production.  Formal 
institutions also influence the balance of diversionary (rent-seeking) and productive 
activities in society (Hall and Jones 1999).  Countries with a history of institutions that 
support productive activities such as capital accumulation, skill acquisition, invention and 
technology transfer produce much higher levels of output per worker.  
Formal institutions include the political (those that determine the structure of the state and 
the procedures of the political decision-making process) and economic (those that 
determine property and contract rights and thereby reduce transaction costs) (Borner, 
Bodmer and Kobler 2004). 
3.2.1 Political  institutions 
Political institutions shape the political process that produces legislation and regulation. 
They also determine the legal system and coordinate the processes that create and 
enforce the law.  Political institutions therefore produce economic institutions and 
determine their quality.  Institutions like democracy and social protection legitimise market 
outcomes and ensure their endurance.  Political institutions can support a market 
economy by shaping and safeguarding property rights and making the market compatible 
with social stability and social cohesion (Borner et al 2004, Rodrik 2000). 
Political institutions tend to reflect the interests of those in power and can therefore 
produce economic institutions that are redistributive or productive (Granovetter and 
Swedburg 1992).  Where a particular group has control over political processes and/or 
economic resources it may ensure that institutional arrangements enable it to maintain 
this control rather than improve efficiency.   
The IMF (2003) has found that countries where Europeans settled in large numbers have 
sustained greater economic development than countries where they empowered a local 
elite.  In the latter group of countries the institutional emphasis has been on maintaining 
the power and wealth of the elite.   
Limiting the power of different segments of society to subvert institutions to their own 
interests, may therefore be important for economic growth.  For effective institutions, the 
state should be strong enough to specify good property and contract laws and must be 
committed to enforcing them, even when this means constraining itself from violating 
these laws for its own ends (Borner et al 2004).  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2002) consider when it is appropriate to enable government to control the 
activities of such groups.  They suggest that for New Zealand, a country with strong law 
and order and no powerful elite, protection of property rights should generally be left to the 
courts to manage. 
As fundamental institutions are longstanding, they tend to change slowly, but occasionally 
windows of opportunity to effect broad efficiency-enhancing reform arise (Williamson 
2000).  Civil wars, occupations, perceived threats, economic breakdowns, military coup 
and financial crises can provide such opportunities.  In the absence of such events, 
change will be slow to achieve.  The nature of the political power structure will shape a 
country’s institutions and thus economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2004).  
At the same time, existing economic institutions affect the distribution of resources (which  
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in turn affects political power and political institutions) and the gains to be made from 
changing the status quo.  The development of economic institutions can thus been seen 
as endogenous. As Rutherford (2001: 190) notes, “institutions shape economic behaviour 
and outcomes and are themselves shaped by economic, political and ideological factors”. 
While there are links between economic growth and political institutions, it is not 
necessarily clear that political institutions cause economic growth (Aron 2000).  Glaeser, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) suggest that investments in human and 
social capital lead to economic growth, which leads to better political institutions, which 
then have second order effects on economic growth.  They suggest that higher human 
and social capital leads to more benign politics, less violence and more political stability.  
This in turn brings about greater security of property and economic growth.  Secure 
property rights support investment in human and physical capital and these can be 
achieved under dictators as well as democracies.  Countries that emerge from poverty 
can accumulate human and physical capital under dictatorships and are more likely to 
improve their institutions when they became richer.  Neither Aron nor Glaeser et al rule 
out political institutions as an influence on economic growth but raise questions about the 
methodologies used in previous literature to measure institutions and their impacts.   
However, they reiterate the importance of economic institutions, ie, secure property rights, 
for investment and economic activity regardless of the role of political institutions.  
3.2.2 Economic  institutions 
The role of political institutions in the creation of economic institutions means that 
economic institutions will not always be designed in ways that aim to maximise economic 
growth.  However, the distribution of political power can change over time as the political 
and economic environment change and create an appetite for efficiency-enhancing 
change in economic institutions.   
The feasibility of introducing and sustaining good institutions is determined in large by the 
country’s existing institutional framework and the way in which it distributes political power 
within the country.  As a consequence, institutional reform can be difficult to spur.  It may 
take a domestic crisis or external pressure to drive institutional change or it may be a slow 
evolution as gradual change in underlying social institutions drives change in political and 
economic institutions.  Profound institutional change and development may need to be 
made slowly to ensure that the system created is compatible with social institutions and to 
ensure that it can be effectively enforced (Aron 2000).  In more developed countries, 
change is likely to be less fundamental as many of the necessary institutional settings will 
already be in place. 
For change in economic institutions to be successful it is important to consider the 
feasibility of introducing and sustaining good institutions, to understand what successful 
market based institutions deliver, to recognise the appropriate form institutions should 
take, and to understand what can be done to spur institutional reform (New Zealand 
Treasury 2004).   
The development of economic institutions can be fostered by three broad types of policy 
mechanisms identified by the IMF (2003).  Competition and trade openness may help to 
weaken vested interests and lead to demands for institutions that are suitable for a wide 
variety of transactions.  Greater transparency and better information can help reduce 
corruption, increase government effectiveness and improve policy development.   
Conditionality for international economic agreements and associations can help to break 
through domestic impediments to reform.  
WP 04/19  INSTITUTIONS, FIRMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  9  
There are a number of ways of characterising efficient economic institutions.  Good 
economic institutions can be defined as those that provide security of property rights and 
relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society.  Such 
economic institutions would reduce pressures to seek change to political institutions and 
thereby future economic institutions.  The quality of both formal and informal institutions 
can also be assessed in terms of their respect for contracts, property rights, trust, and civil 
freedom (Aron 2000).  Successful market based institutions should also improve certainty 
about the outcomes of economic activity.   
Property rights and contract enforcement improve the environment for economic activity 
by reducing the transactions costs faced by firms.  As Coase (1960) suggests, institutions 
matter when there are transaction costs.  Since transaction costs, that include all the 
costs of doing business, are ubiquitous, institutions always matter.  North (1994) notes 
“When it is costly to transact, then institutions matter.  And it is costly to transact.”   
Uncertainty about whether a firm will receive its expected return from an exchange with 
another party gives rise to transaction costs.  It is not possible to anticipate in advance all 
the circumstances that may affect an agreement.  It is not always possible to determine 
whether the parties to an agreement are acting honestly or opportunistically.  Risks also 
arise from outside the agreement where parties that are not involved in an exchange 
(such as the government) can take some or all of the profits or assets involved in the 
exchange. 
Firms encounter transaction costs when they attempt to reduce their uncertainty about the 
outcomes of an exchange.  Uncertainty is reduced by rules around property rights and 
contract enforcement that increase the likelihood of expected outcomes.  These 
institutions provide assurance for firms that they will maintain ownership of assets they 
have invested in and will receive their due from an exchange with another party.   
All countries have economic institutions and their quality determines the level of 
transaction costs facing firms.  Institutions can reduce the level of transaction costs if they 
improve the information available to firms and make bargaining, monitoring and 
enforcement easier.  As North (1991) notes, effective institutional arrangements provide 
comfort that the gains of trade are realisable.  Institutional arrangements that lead to a 
greater shared understanding of the grounds for trading and to greater confidence that 
those grounds would be enforced reduce the efforts that firms need to make to manage 
risks, allowing them to focus more on production and exchange.   
Property rights provide protection of assets held by an individual or firm against 
expropriation by others.  They ensure the firm maintains control over the returns to the 
assets it has invested in.  Economic institutions that allow property rights to be secured 
enable people to keep the returns on their investment, make contracts, and resolve 
disputes (Djankov et al 2002).   Such security encourages people to invest in themselves 
and in physical capital, and therefore fosters economic growth.  This security will also 
provide firms with the confidence to invest in human capital to improve the productivity of 
labour and as a complementary investment to physical capital. 
In modern societies property rights are defined and enforced by the state.  However, the 
greatest risk of expropriation comes from the state, often through uncompensated 
regulation (Epstein 1985, 1999).  Countries with greater constraints on politicians and 
elites, and more protection against appropriation by these powerful groups, have 
substantially higher income per capita.  When there are no checks on the state, on 
politicians or on elites, private citizens do not have the security of property rights  
WP 04/19  INSTITUTIONS, FIRMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  10  
necessary for investment (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003).  Nevertheless, governments do 
face pressure not to violate the rules set for their own purposes (Rodrik 2003). 
Without reliable property rights enforcement, firms will tend to be small scale, to use low-
capital technology, and to have short-term horizons (Aron 2000).  Investment in human 
and physical capital is especially sensitive to the security of property rights, because of 
the long time period involved (Borner et al 2004).  If property rights are improperly defined 
or left ambiguous and unenforced, resources will be wasted as people try to capture or 
defend their claims to resources (Saleh 2004). 
Institutions that enforce contracts provide assurance to firms when they are negotiating an 
exchange that their interests are protected, should the agreement not be fulfilled.   
Contract enforcement addresses some of the uncertainty inherent in open market 
transactions.  Sophisticated contracts can facilitate complex transactions, involving 
multiple parties, covering long time periods and requiring interrelated projects and 
deliveries (Saleh 2004).  Without effective enforcement, potentially valuable exchange 
might be forgone.  
While contract enforcement institutions can reduce uncertainty, they can increase 
transaction costs in other ways.  Defining and enforcing contracts is not costless.  Firms 
face costs associated with commissioning lawyers and spending time in court, where this 
becomes necessary to resolve a contractual dispute.  Firms may choose not to pursue the 
completion of a contract if it would be more costly for them to do so than it would be to find 
another solution or to walk away.  Thus, effective institutions are those that give firms 
confidence that contracts can be enforced in a timely and costly manner. 
The origin of the law seems to matter.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002) found that common law is better able than civil law to provide protection against 
both the private expropriation of property (achieved through government controls that 
provide law and order) and public expropriation of property (achieved through controls 
over government).
4
  The greater legal formalism of the civil law tradition has higher costs 
of enforcing contracts, longer delays in courts and results in lower perceived fairness and 
efficiency of the judiciary system (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003).
5
 
3.3  New Zealand’s underlying institutions 
New Zealand’s underlying institutions are seen to be broadly robust, providing a strong 
basis for economic activity.  New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy following the 
Westminster model.  Its legal framework is based on the common law system that 
originated from Britain.  Petrie (2002) suggests that New Zealand’s institutional heritage 
gives it reason to be confident of the basic soundness of its underpinning institutions.   
A distinctive New Zealand institution is the Treaty of Waitangi, which has come to be 
recognised as the founding document for relations between British colonisers and Māori at 
                                                                 
4 In comparison to civil law, common law tends to be characterised by greater independence of judges, greater importance placed on 
juries and greater reliance on broad legal principles such as fiduciary duty to resolve disputes.  Civil law makes greater use of control 
and oversight of lower level judicial decisions through superior review.  Civil law countries tend to exhibit heavier government 
intervention in economic activity and greater corruption with no greater benefits in terms of social and economic outcomes.   
5 Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) find that property rights institutions have a major influence on long-run economic growth, investment 
and financial development while contract enforcement institutions appear to affect the form of financial intermediation and the form of 
regulation, but have more limited effects on growth, investment and the total amount of credit in the economy.  
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the time of significant colonisation in 1840.
6
  The status of the Treaty and the nature of its 
obligations are a source of ongoing public debate.  Social attitudes towards the legitimacy 
and ongoing relevance of the Treaty of Waitangi to such things as the governance of 
public organisations, and as a driver for settling historical claims have varied over time 
and between different groups.  This is a process that will continue to generate tensions 
and to stretch the basis on which groups and communities interact with each other. 
Ambiguity around interpretations of the Treaty has led to ambiguity about property rights 
in some areas, which have at times become the focus of social conflict.  While difficult, 
such conflict is to some degree inevitable in any complex society, particularly one that is 
characterised by ethnic diversity.  Contemporary interpretations of the Treaty have evoked 
public debate around its application to the question of property rights, particularly the 
nature and extent of any rights and interests that have not been extinguished, and the 
degree to which these impinge or otherwise on privately held or publicly administered 
property rights.  The benefit of the Treaty is that it provides a framework for considering 
and dealing with conflict.   
Petrie (2002) suggests differences of view on Treaty settlements reflect, in part, the 
presence of competing norms within New Zealand on appropriate governance models.  
Norms related to democratic accountability for resources at the national level may not sit 
comfortably with the desire by Māori for greater autonomy and different norms of 
governance of the assets that they receive by way of compensation for past grievances.  
The key issues for Māori and the Crown are to create structures that reflect the fluidity of 
the Māori social processes, enable efficient allocation decisions and fair distributional 
processes, reshape governance arrangements to reflect changing circumstances and 
further develop skills related to governance and participation (New Zealand Treasury 
2001). 
To some degree, concerns about the Treaty of Waitangi are conflated with concerns that 
are not institution in nature and relate to public expenditure on programmes to improve 
outcomes for Māori, who are, as a group, overrepresented in lower socio-economic 
groups.  Concerns have arisen about the equity of focusing on ethnicity as a basis for 
targeting government funding as well as the probity of some government programmes 
administered by or on behalf of Māori. 
New Zealand generally scores well in international assessments of its political institutions, 
legislative framework and economic institutions.  IMD International ranks New Zealand 9
th 
out of 60 countries in terms of the transparency of government processes, 4
th in terms of 
the independence of the public service from political interference, 4
th on the absence of 
bribing and corruption and 12
th in terms of political stability.  Transparency International 
ranked New Zealand second in its 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index and it has been 
ranked no lower than third since the index began in 1996 (Henderson, Cave and Petrie 
2003).  The World Economic Forum (2003) ranked New Zealand 4
th in terms of public 
institutions in the Global Competitiveness Report
7
, including rankings of 4
th in terms of 
                                                                 
6 The Treaty of Waitangi covered issues of governance of/sovereignty over New Zealand, property rights of Māori over land and 
resources, and the rights of Māori as British subjects.  These issues have been subject to significant discord over time, driven by 
differences in the meaning of Māori and English texts of the Treaty, other developments in settler governance (such as the 
establishment of a parliament for settlers), and conflicts over land ownership.  The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 re-established the role 
of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s legal system and has been the basis for settlements of Māori grievances over land or other 
resources taken in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi.  See www.treatyofwaitangi.govt.nz for a history of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
7 The Global Competitiveness Report evaluates the economic competitiveness and growth potential of 102 countries based on 
available data combined with surveys of local business executives and entrepreneurs and their perceptions of the business 
environment.  This report considers the macroeconomic climate, public institutions and technological progress.  Overall, the report 
ranks New Zealand 14th out of 102 countries.  
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corruption and 5
th on contracts and laws.  In the Economic Freedom of the World, 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004)
8
 assess the legal structures and security of property rights 
around the world and score New Zealand’s system at 9.0, with 10.0 being the best 
possible score.  The World Bank (2004)
9
 looks at the ease or difficulty of enforcing 
commercial contracts and finds the complexity of contract enforcement to be low in New 
Zealand, involving a relatively simple process that takes a very short time to complete.   
In terms of the consequences of social institutions for economic activity, the International 
Institute of Management Development, or IMD International (2004)
10
, ranks New Zealand 
24
th out of the 60 economies in its World Competition Yearbook in terms of whether the 
values of a society support competitiveness.  This suggests that New Zealanders may not 
place an especially strong emphasis on economic activity and competitiveness.
11
   
4 Activity-specific  institutions 
The formal institutions discussed in the previous section provide the general environment 
in which business takes place.  Once property rights and access to economic resources 
are defined for a country, economic activity, i.e., production and exchange, can be 
undertaken with greater confidence.   
Formal institutions also exist to support the specific activities involved in firm production 
and exchange decisions.  The types of activities these institutions govern include 
employment, investment in physical capital and use of land and natural resources 
(production); competition and corporate governance (exchange).   
4.1  Differences between underlying and activity-specific 
institutions 
There are some differences between the underlying and activity-specific institutions that 
mean they operate somewhat differently, in terms of the scope and longevity of their 
effects.   
4.1.1 Scope 
Like underlying formal institutions, activity-specific institutions are introduced to reduce 
transactions costs or to achieve political objectives.  However, activity-specific institutions 
address outcomes that are specific to particular markets rather than economy-wide.   
                                                                 
8 Gwartney and Lawson (2004) prepare a report for the Fraser Institute called the Economic Freedom of the World that ranks 123 
countries in terms of the consistency of their policies and institutions with economic freedom, ie, whether they provide an infrastructure 
for voluntary exchange and protect individuals and their property.  This draws on the Global Competitiveness Report and the 
International Country Risk Guide, which provides information on financial and political risks for international investors.  Overall, the 
report ranks New Zealand 3rd out of 123 countries. 
9 The World Bank assesses data on five key aspects of doing business: starting a business, hiring and firing workers, enforcing 
contracts, getting credit and closing a business.  New Zealand rates well in each of these areas of business regulation on the factors 
(such as timeliness, cost, flexibility, efficient and complexity) that are assessed. 
10 The International Institute of Management Development produces the World Competitiveness Yearbook, which ranks 60 countries 
and regional economics on their ability to create and maintain an environment that sustains the competitiveness of enterprises, based 
on economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure.  Overall, it ranks New Zealand 18th out of the 
60 economies. 
11 This seems to be borne out by research conducted by the Growth and Innovation Advisory Board where New Zealanders ranked 
factors such as quality of life, quality of education, quality of the natural environment and race relations ahead of factors such as 
potential to increase personal wealth, level of economic growth and business opportunities.  See www.giab.govt.nz for further details.  
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Activity-specific institutions contribute to growth where they reduce externalities or 
opportunistic behaviour in particular markets.  Externalities can arise when people 
engaged in economic activity do not have to take into account the full costs of their 
actions.  For example, where land users pollute waterways that flow through their land this 
affects the use that those downstream can make of that water.  Opportunistic behaviour 
may arise where one party has information that is not available to another or where there 
are imbalances of market power, as can arise in employment relationships.   
Like underlying institutions, activity-specific institutions will reflect a country’s social 
institutions.  The form institutions take will depend on factors like a country’s preferences 
for equity and opportunity, what would work with existing institutions in other areas and 
the degree to which the country is economically developed (Rodrik 2003).  If a country’s 
preferences for equity and opportunity are not reflected in the institutions adopted this 
may reduce compliance with the requirements of an institution.   
In general, each activity-specific institution deals with a market that is a subset of the 
economy.   There will be interrelationships between different activity-specific institutions 
where they intersect or overlap.  Where a new institution does not fit well with the existing 
institutional framework it may undermine compliance by creating complexity and 
uncertainty.  Freeman (2000) notes that an institution may affect outcomes differently 
depending on the other institutions that operate around it.  He notes that an institution, eg 
a trade union, may operate in different ways in different legal and economic environments.   
4.1.2 Longevity 
Activity-specific institutions change more frequently than underlying institutions.  To 
ensure institutions remain efficient and relevant over time, they need to be able to adapt to 
changing circumstances.  Rodrik (2003) suggests that while institutions matter for 
economic growth, it is how they adapt to change that is most crucial for economic growth.  
In this way, he sees the role of institutions in economic growth as similar to that of 
technology.  The capacity for adaptation of settings is be more important than the 
continuance of any particular settings.   
Adaptability may be built into institutional settings to some extent, but will also require 
countries to change their arrangements when they become obstacles to economic growth.  
To ensure economic growth is maintained over time and to ensure an economy remains 
resilient against shocks, a cumulative process of institution building is necessary (Rodrik 
2003).  Institutional change can be seen as endogenous to the growth process as 
changes accompanying growth, such as changes in technology and preferences, drive 
further changes in institutional form (Engerman and Sokoloff 2003).   
4.2  Institutions, firm productivity and human capital 
Economic growth comes from an increase in the production and exchange activities 
undertaken by firms.  Institutions governing these activities will therefore directly affect a 
country’s potential economic growth.  Improvements in firm productivity drive economic 
growth and there are three components to firm productivity: 
a)  productivity gains within firms, owing to more efficient use of existing resources and 
investment in factor enhancements;  
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b) firm entry and exit, where new, more productive firms are established and less 
productive firms leave the market; and 
c)  more productive firms increasing market share compared to less productive firms. 
4.2.1  Productivity gains within firms 
Productivity within firms is optimised in two ways: by using available resources in the most 
efficient way and by being innovative.  This involves combining amounts of labour, 
physical capital, land and other natural resources of appropriate quality to produce the 
most output possible
12
.   
Labour productivity (output per worker) is one component of firm productivity.  Labour 
productivity improvements can come through multifactor productivity improvements (the 
efficiency with which labour and capital are used) or growth in the capital-labour ratio.  
Improvements in multifactor productivity come through eliminating slack in the use of 
resources, adopting more efficient technologies and increasing innovative effort.   
Improvements in the capital-labour ratio mean that more capital is available to individual 
workers.  Labour productivity changes as the quantity and quality of other resources 
change.  Investments in human capital enhance labour productivity where additional skills 
and knowledge enable workers to produce more with the same level of resources. 
Firm productivity can also be increased through innovation.  Innovation can be embodied 
as new physical capital technology, new ideas about production processes or changes to 
the products being made.  Innovation will change the nature of the resources needed by 
the firm and will lead to changes in the ideal resource mix.  Innovation that is embodied in 
new physical capital will often require less labour in the production process, but requires 
the labour that is used to be more highly skilled to operate new technologies.  Innovations 
technology may allow greater quantities or higher value products to be produced with the 
same level of resources, increasing the firm’s productivity.  Durbin (2004) notes that 
studies of firms utilising advanced technologies conclude that such firms tend to employ a 
more skilled and highly paid workforce and tend to be more productive than other firms 
prior to the adoption of new technologies.  He notes that new technologies are more likely 
to be used by abler and better paid workers.  
As well as assisting with the adoption of new technology, human capital is a factor in the 
creation of new technologies.  Firms that wish to be innovative will invest in human capital 
to generate innovations within the firm.   
Durbin (2004) notes that institutions can affect the levels of innovation arising from 
entrepreneurial activity.  He notes that regulations can influence the availability of 
business opportunities for entrepreneurs, the costs of pursuing them and the returns from 
doing so. 
4.2.2  Productivity gains through changing industry composition 
Economy-wide productivity is optimised in a dynamic market environment that allows and 
encourages firms to be created, to grow or to shrink depending on their productivity.  As 
noted above, firm productivity is driven by resource allocation and innovation.  The 
pressures present in an industry for a firm to allocate resources efficiently and to be 
innovative will determine how dynamic the market is.  Such pressures stem from the 
                                                                 
12 This paper refers to productivity in outputs, but the principles hold also for productivity in services.  
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degree of competitiveness in an industry and the extent of discipline that corporate 
governance exercises over the activities of managers within firms.   
The more pressure there is to innovate to gain market share and remain in the industry, 
the greater the investment in human capital firms are likely to make.  Scarpetta and 
Tressel (2004) find that investment in human capital impacts positively on productivity 
growth in all industries. 
4.3  Institutions and resource allocation  
Institutional settings will influence decisions made by firms about the factors of production 
they employ and how they deploy them.  Institutions affect the attractiveness of the 
different resources by changing their availability, flexibility and cost.  While firms need a 
minimum amount of each or some of the factors, they have discretion over how much of 
each they will use in total.   
The effect of institutions on the relative attractiveness of the factors will lead firms to 
change the mix of resources they use.  For example, institutions governing the 
employment of workers will affect the availability, flexibility and cost of labour and thereby 
firm decisions about hiring labour and investing in human capital.  However, institutions 
governing the use of physical capital, land and other natural resources can also affect 
firms’ decisions about labour.  These institutions may constrain firms more or less in their 
production decisions than institutions governing the use of labour, altering the relative 
attractiveness of labour as an input.   
To maximise economic growth, institutions ideally enable the factors of production to flow 
to where they will generate the greatest return.  Institutions will lead firms to change from 
what would be an optimal mix in an unconstrained environment to what is optimal given 
the constraints introduced by institutions.  If one factor becomes relatively less attractive 
because institutions make it more costly, where possible firms will substitute other 
resources for it.   
The overall effect of institutions on the use of or investment in particular factors is not a 
straightforward relationship.  Institutions introduced to address issues related to one factor 
of production can have implications for the use of other factors, which may not have been 
an intention of the institutional change.   
The extent to which institutions influence the relative attractiveness of the factors will 
therefore affect the levels of investment that firms make in each of the factors.  For 
example, stricter labour regulations may make labour less flexible and more costly, which 
may lead firms to make greater use of physical capital in their production processes.   
However, greater use of physical capital may require greater investment in the human 
capital of the firm’s workers.   
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of institutions on resource allocation.  
Figure 2 – Resource allocation within firms 
 
The effect of institutions on the use of labour, capital and land and other natural resources 
in discussed in section 5. 
4.4  Institutions, transactions and governance 
Firms transact with each other to sell their products or to buy inputs into their production 
processes.  As discussed earlier, there are costs associated with transactions, which may 
deter firms from transacting if the costs are too high.  Firms exist to reduce transaction 
costs.  Coase (1937) explains the costs of transacting as the cost of discovering what the 
relevant prices are and negotiating and concluding a contract for each exchange.  Key 
transaction costs include information, monitoring and uncertainty.   
Resource owners will create a firm if they can coordinate resources and produce output at 
a lower cost within the firm structure than they could acquire inputs for on the open 
market.   
Institutions influence transaction costs and therefore the establishment of firms.  They 
influence the number, size and structure of firms that are established in a market.  They 
affect the relative attractiveness of within firm activities and between firm transactions by 
changing the costs associated with these two means of organising production.  Property 
rights and contract enforcement institutions determine transaction costs, corporate 
governance institutions influence agency costs, and product market institutions determine 
firms’ access to markets.   
Institutions that result in higher transaction costs may discourage the creation of new 
firms, increase the size of existing firms and reduce transactions, if it is less costly to 
undertake exchanges within the firm.  However, if property rights and contract institutions 
reduce transaction costs, they provide a pressure on management to improve the 
efficiency of their production processes, to avoid outsourcing of their functions and loss of 
their jobs. 
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Figure 3 – Transactions between firms 
 
Firm  Firm  Firm 
The effects of product market and corporate governance institutions are discussed in 
section 6. 
4.5  New Zealand’s activity-specific institutions 
New Zealand’s activity-specific institutions are rated highly in international comparisons.  
In the World Competitiveness Yearbook, IMD International (2004) rank New Zealand 9
th 
out of 60 countries for its business legislation, which covers institutions related to labour, 
capital and product markets.  In the Economic Freedom of the World, New Zealand is 
ranked 4
th in terms of its business regulation (again, related to labour, capital and product 
markets).  McMillan (2004) suggests that New Zealand’s labour markets and financial 
markets seem to be doing their job and that there is no need for more or for less 
government action. 
5  Resource use within firms 
This section discusses institutions related to the use of the factors of production – labour, 
capital, land and other natural resources. 
5.1 Labour 
Labour market institutions govern the interactions between firms needing labour and 
workers supplying their labour.  The institutions aim to improve the operation of labour 
markets by addressing information problems faced by employers and workers to ensure 
balance in the market power of employers and workers and to provide insurance against 
the risk of unemployment.  They aim to encourage greater commitment between workers 
and employers.   
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The existence of labour market institutions provides both employers and workers with 
greater certainty about their rights and obligations in the labour market relationship.  They 
place requirements on employers that can encourage workers to take up jobs by providing 
protection against unfair treatment.  These requirements can also help employers by 
providing clarity on the grounds and processes for employment separation.  This can 
reduce the level of legal action between employers and former workers.   
While labour market institutions have positive implications for employment relationships, 
they can also have negative consequences.  They can reduce the availability and 
flexibility of labour and increase its cost to firms while reducing employment opportunities 
for workers.  In the short term, this may reduce the returns to firms associated with 
employing workers and increase the returns to workers.  In the long term, it may reduce 
employment levels. 
The effect that institutions have on the use of labour by firms will depend on the nature of 
the particular institutions a country adopts.  Institutions will introduce a degree of rigidity 
into labour market interactions, the effects of which can range from contributing to 
certainty to being overly prescriptive.  Very prescriptive institutions may be time-
consuming and costly to comply with and may limit the ability of firms to adapt to changing 
environments and economic shocks.   
This does not imply that complete flexibility in the labour market is necessary for economic 
growth.  While institutions can constrain employers in terms of their resource allocations, 
firm are likely to have some capacity to absorb excess staffing and labour costs.  It is 
unlikely that they would need to be able to completely reduce their labour force as part of 
maximising their resource mix under normal operating circumstances.  Firms in different 
industries are also likely to require different levels of flexibility, so the effect of labour 
market institutions will vary across industries. 
Labour markets regulations are can be classified as employment protection, contracting, 
minimum wages, collective bargaining and non-wage terms and conditions.  The 
regulations enhance the security of workers’ employment tenure, ensure workers receive 
minimum levels of payment and working conditions in exchange for their labour and by 
provide workers with processes for negotiating these terms and conditions with 
employers.  Labour market regulations are described briefly in Table 1 below.    
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Table 1 – Labour market regulations 
Regulation Description 
Employment protection  Cover aspects of the employment relationship related to: 
hiring: e.g., the kinds of contracts permitted, rules favouring the hiring of certain groups; and  
firing: e.g., requirements for severance and advance notice of termination, redundancy 
procedures, rules for mass layoffs.   
Contracting regulations  Provide rules for employing “non-standard” workers, i.e., employees on fixed-term contracts 
and temporary agency workers.   
Can involve setting limits on the occupations where non-standard workers can be employed 
and the maximum duration for employment.   
Minimum wages  Set a floor for what employers can pay employees.   
Can also specify who is covered, differentiation across different groups, rules about inflation 
adjustment and the process for setting the level.   
Collective bargaining  Refers to processes of setting terms and conditions of employment between employers and 
coordinated groups of employees (i.e., unions).   
Non-wage terms and 
conditions 
Relate to safety requirements, working hour restrictions, leave requirements and mandated 
contributions to social security funds.   
5.1.1 Resource  allocation 
These requirements can make labour less flexible or more costly and therefore less 
attractive to firms compared to other factors of production (although this will depend on 
what restrictions are imposed by institutions governing the use of other factors).   
Employment protection rules protect workers by requiring employers to meet certain 
requirements before they can dismiss workers.  This reduces the flexibility that firms have 
in terms of their labour force, leading employers to be reluctant to hire workers if they are 
not able to dismiss them when the labour is no longer needed or if doing so involves 
costly severance payments.  Employment protection reduces flows into and out of 
employment and increases the duration of joblessness (Addison and Teixeira 2003, 
Lazear 1990). 
Minimum wages can increase the cost of producing a given level of output and make 
production less profitable, reducing the incentives for firms to expand production.   
However, some alternative models of the labour market where firms have some wage-
setting discretion and where workers have little bargaining power, predict neutral or even 




Collective bargaining can lead labour to be more costly and less flexible.  Unions can 
reduce labour productivity by requiring unnecessary jobs to be done or requiring 
necessary jobs to be done in an inefficient manner (Maloney 1998).   
Where labour market institutions lead to a resource mix that is more costly from the firm’s 
perspective, they may choose to substitute other factor inputs for labour over time.  This 
may mean firms do not invest in the human capital of their workers, if labour is seen as 
                                                                 
13 Card and Krueger (1995) also found an increase in employment in the U.S. fast-food industry following an increase in the minimum 
wage, although their methodology and result were challenged by Neumark and Wascher (2000).  
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too inflexible.  Alternatively, labour productivity can improve as a result of a resource shift, 
if the productivity of the remaining workers is increased by extra physical capital or other 
resources.  Firms may choose to enhance labour productivity by investing in the human 
capital of a reduced workforce to make full use of the resources substituted for labour.   
While labour market institutions can reduce the flexibility or increase the cost of labour, 
they may also improve the quality of the input from labour which can offset the reduction 
in flexibility and cost and make a positive contribution to firm productivity.  Where labour 
market institutions create an environment that is conducive to greater collaboration 
between workers and employers, they can improve the quality of contribution workers 
make to the firm, e.g., through playing an active role in the innovation process 
(Maloney 1998).  An enhanced contribution from workers may significantly improve labour 
productivity and through this the productivity of the firm.   
Collective bargaining can increase firm productivity where it is associated with better 
worker-employer relationships.  Where collective bargaining provides greater “voice” for 
workers it can facilitate discussion and resolution of workplace disputes, leading to 
reduced job turnover and greater communication over productivity improvements.  Job 
protection can also improve the contribution that labour makes to production.  Nickell and 
Layard (1999) find that substantive employee participation, where employees have some 
degree of autonomy in decision taking, is associated with productivity growth.  They 
suggest productivity improvements often depend on the cooperation of workers or on their 
ideas and suggestions.  These will be withheld if individuals feel their jobs are at risk as a 
consequence.  Substantive participation can require more training and this is only worth 
providing if the employment relationship is long-term.   
Overall, the effect of labour market institutions on firm productivity via changes in labour 
productivity will depend on how the institutions affect the relationship between workers 
and employers and whether improvements in the quality of labour’s input increase 
productivity more or less than they increase the cost and inflexibility of labour.  
5.1.2  Innovation and human capital 
Labour market institutions will influence the share of the returns from an innovation that 
accrue to the firm as profits and to labour as higher wages.  The share accruing to 
workers from greater productivity will depend on the strength of their bargaining power, 
which is determined by institutional arrangements and demand for their skills in the labour 
market.  Firm investment levels can be reduced where unions are able to capture some 
the rents associated with these investment (Nickell and Layard 1999).  
Implementing an innovation often requires moving to a new optimal mix of human and 
physical capital.  Acquiring a different range of skills is not simply a matter of reducing the 
number of workers but changing in the composition of the firms’ workforce in terms of its 
human capital characteristics.  Labour market institutions such as job protection and 
unionisation can make the adjustment of employment arrangements associated with 
shifting to a new technology difficult or costly, particularly in industries where there is 
limited scope to expand production (Bassanini and Ernst 2002, Scarpetta, Hemmings, 
Tressel and Woo 2002). Unions may slow down the introduction of new technology and 
work place practices where these undermine the bargaining strength of union members, 
although when a union embraces new technology or work practices it can enhance their 
contribution to productivity growth (Nickell and Layard 1999).  
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With job protection and unionisation, the relationship between workers and employers is 
more permanent.  To get the most out of the workforce that they have, firms are more 
likely to invest in their human capital.  However, where the current labour force is not well 
suited to acquiring the human capital required, labour market institutions may hinder 
innovation.  The effect of labour market institutions may depend on the technological 
characteristics of the sector in which firms operate.  In low-tech industries, high firing 
costs may lead to higher adjustment costs with negative effects on innovation and 
technology adoption while the effect on high-tech industries depends on the nature of the 
technology employed (Scarpetta and Tressel 2004).  Countries with high firing costs tend 
to specialise in innovations that improve the efficiency of the production of existing goods 
rather than innovations that lead to new goods.  Where technological progress arises from 
further innovations following a trajectory, rather than innovations that require shifts in the 
type of physical and human capital used, investing in the internal labour force can be an 
effective way to overcome high firing costs (Scarpetta and Tressel 2004).   
5.1.3 Productivity 
Of the labour market institutions, the most significant in terms of their effect on productivity 
are likely to be job protection regulations and unionisation.  They will limit firm resource 
flexibility and may limit the returns that firms can capture through innovations.  However, 
they can also increase the quality of labour’s input into the production process.  The 
overall effect of a country’s labour market institutions will depend on the extent to which 
they encourage productivity enhancing or diminishing behaviour.  This may be influenced 
by institutions in other areas, such as product markets, that maintain pressure on firms to 
look for efficiency and innovation opportunities and that influence the technological 
characteristics of the industries operating in a country. 
At the national level, Nickell and Layard (1999) suggest that labour market institutions 
appear to have a strong association with unemployment, some association with labour 
input and a weak association with productivity growth.  Freeman (2000) notes that 
differences in the labour market institutions that exist among advanced countries have 
significant distributional effects, but weaker and uncertain effects on efficiency outcomes.  
He suggests that while wage setting institutions reduce inequality in economic rewards 
they have modest effects on efficiency outcomes as interventions in advanced capitalist 
economies rarely give unions significant power over a critical part of the economy.   
Flexible labour market institutions may be most useful in allowing a country to adjust to 
economic shocks while minimising the effects on output.  The IMF (2003) notes that when 
labour markets are more competitive, the economy reacts more quickly and smoothly to 
changes in interest rates, which means smaller changes in interest rates, and therefore 
output, are necessary to stabilise inflation in the face of shocks. 
5.1.4  Government activities affecting the supply of labour 
As well as institutions in the labour market, there are other governmental factors that 
affect the labour market through their impact on labour supply.  Government activities 
such as taxation, benefit provision, public education provision and public health provision 
determine the quantity and quality of labour that is available.  These influence the 
decisions of workers to supply their labour and to invest in their own human capital.    
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5.1.5  New Zealand labour market institutions 
Many of New Zealand’s labour market institutions are set out in the Employment Relations 
Act 2000 (ERA).  The ERA was enacted to unwind some of the changes to labour markets 
brought in by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA), although it does not return fully 
to the previous institutional settings.  In general, it promotes collective bargaining and 
provides for unions to play a greater role in the employment relationship.   
A study of the short term impacts of the ERA was published by the Department of Labour 
in November 2003 (New Zealand Department of Labour 2003).  The study finds that the 
Act has had little impact on most employees, particularly those in small workplaces.   
There has been little change in the extent and coverage of collective bargaining and 
increases tend to be in areas where there is existing and historical union coverage, such 
as the public sector.  There has been little increase in levels of union coverage as a 
proportion of the workforce.  Further assessment of the ERA would be useful after it has 
been in place for longer, especially as amendments to the Act are currently being 
considered by Parliament. 
Analysis carried out by Maloney (1998) on the impact of the introduction of the ECA 
provides some interesting insights into how institutional change can affect resource 
allocation by New Zealand firms.  Maloney found that the ECA reduced union density and 
through this increased output and utilisation of labour but reduced productivity.  The 
greater availability of labour led employers to utilise labour more intensively rather than to 
invest in physical or human capital.  The reduction in unionisation after the introduction of 
the ECA made labour relatively more available and cost effective as a factor of production 
than physical capital.  This led to labour contributing more to economic growth through 
labour utilisation than through labour productivity.   
A number of changes are being made to other regulations such as holiday and parental 
leave entitlements.  These changes may reduce the flexibility of the labour market and 
negatively impact on growth if they restrict the flexibility of firms in their resourcing 
decisions.  However, in terms of their impact on costs, the literature suggests that non-
wage terms and conditions tend to be accommodated through adjustments to wages and 
may therefore be neutral for labour costs and productivity growth.
14
  
Overall, New Zealand’s labour market institutions are relatively flexible compared to those 
of many other countries.  McMillan (2004) suggests that, compared to other countries, the 
levels of job creation and destruction exhibited in New Zealand imply its labour markets 
and economy has a considerable degree of adaptability.  The World Bank (2004) 
benchmarks the business regulations of 133 countries and ranks New Zealand 10
th in 
terms of the flexibility of hiring, firing and the conditions of employment and 5
th of the 
OECD countries, as shown below.   
                                                                 
14 Nickell and Layard (1999) report studies that find that mandated workers compensation insurance, inclusion of maternity coverage in 
company health insurance policies and parental leave entitlements are factored into wages with no adverse employment effects.  
However, they note others that find that environmental protection and health and safety regulation have reduced employment in small 
firms.  Overall, they find that there is very little evidence on the impact of terms and conditions on productivity growth and no evidence 
of negative effects.  
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5.2 Capital 
Financial market institutions oversee the operation of the financial system.
15
  These 
institutions affect the availability of finance by influencing the confidence that savers and 
lenders have in the financial system.   
Institutions need to protect the soundness of the financial system and ensure that financial 
organisations do not undermine the functioning of the market.  Capital markets are 
particularly sensitive to the problems of asymmetric information and high transaction costs 
and are prone to fail in environments without the appropriate legal and regulatory 
institutions (Saleh 2004).  A sound financial system provides savers and lenders with 
confidence that their funds are adequately safeguarded within the system by establishing 
a framework of rules on the obligations of financial organisations as well as setting 
parameters around the types of activities they can engage in and consequences for non-
compliance.   
Institutions also need to protect the freedom of financial organisations to exercise 
professional judgement about investment opportunities and provide savers and lenders 
with financial products with a range of risk/return profiles.  Institutions that allow for 
flexibility enable financial organisations to invest in projects where there are high levels of 
uncertainty and high potential returns.  The level of uncertainty associated with the returns 
to innovation is high, particularly with inventions, as little is known in advance that can 
indicate their likely success (Tong and Xu 2004). 
Institutions that effectively balance the flexibility available to financial organisations while 
providing savers and lenders with confidence in the stability of the financial system are 
                                                                 
15 See Claus, Jacobsen and Jera (2004) for a review of the literature on finance and economic growth.  
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particularly important for the development of new technologies and the contribution they 
can make to economic growth.  Confidence in the financial system ensures funds are 
generally available for investment in an economy while flexibility ensures that some of 
these funds are available for innovative ventures. 
Firms in an open economy can access finance internationally if they are not able to 
access them domestically.  However, the availability of international finance is likely to be 
affected by the quality of financial institutions within the country, meaning that restrictions 
on the availability of finance may still exist.   
5.2.1 Resource  allocation 
Financial market institutions that are either too weak (do not ensure the stability of the 
financial system as a whole) or too strong (overly restrict the flexibility of financial markets) 
are likely to reduce the funds available to firms for investment.  In such cases, firms will 
have to use different, and potentially suboptimal, combinations of inputs to produce their 
output.  For example, where a firm needs a large injection of financial capital to purchase 
physical capital, institutions that undermine the availability of capital or increase its cost 
will make the purchase of physical capital more difficult.  In these circumstances, firms 
may attempt to substitute other factors for physical capital.  Alternatively, they may choose 
not to expand operations in ways that require more physical capital.  
5.2.2  Innovation and human capital 
The availability of financial capital will determine the opportunities for innovation that firms 
can take up.  Thus, institutions that improve the availability of finance can enable firms to 
increase productivity by expanding operations or introducing innovative improvements.   
Financial institutions play a role in the growth process because they are important to the 
provision of funding for capital accumulation and the diffusion of new technologies (OECD 
2003).   
Firms often adopt new technology embedded in new plant and machinery in the process 
of increasing physical capital.  The adoption of new technology can contribute to greater 
firm productivity by increasing the output each worker can produce.  The application of 
new technology often requires complementary investments in human capital, leading to 
increases in labour productivity and thereby higher firm productivity.  Advances in 
technology often have strong links with education, meaning education makes a 
contribution to growth via innovation (OECD 2003).
16
   
Firms will undertake innovation only when the return on the investments in physical and 
human capital is greater than the cost of the investments.  This may not be the case if 
financial market institutions make finance too costly to obtain or if labour market 
institutions mean labour receives more of the benefits of investments than the firm.
17
  In 
such instances, firms may not undertake projects that could otherwise be beneficial to 
lenders, workers and firms. 
                                                                 
16 OECD (2003) uses the average number of years of schooling of the population from 25 to 64 years of age as a proxy for the stock of 
human capital. 
17 Kleiner and Ham (2002) note that decisions about making capital investments in foreign countries are somewhat sensitive to the 
industrial relations climate.  
WP 04/19  INSTITUTIONS, FIRMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  25  
5.2.3  Productivity gains across firms 
Financial market institutions influence the productivity of a country’s overall capital 
investment as well as productivity at the individual firm level.  Financial systems that are 
more developed may have a greater capacity to channel resources towards projects with 
higher returns (OECD 2003). 
McMillan (2004) notes the importance of financial market institutions for assisting firms to 
grow.  Firms need finance to grow and they are unable to obtain this if financial markets 
are underdeveloped from a lack of market-supporting institutions.  McMillan notes that if 
information sources are lacking and investment uncertainties are prevalent, banks may be 
reluctant to lend to small firms, preventing them from growing into medium-sized firms.  
He also notes that information asymmetries for shareholders means that savers/lenders 
may be reluctant to buy stocks, meaning that the stock market may be less active than it 
could be and that firms may be unable to acquire the capital they need.  This can prevent 
medium-sized firms from becoming large firms. 
5.2.4  New Zealand capital institutions  
New Zealand’s financial market institutions mainly rely on information disclosure from 
financial market participants.  While there is mandatory public disclosure of financial and 
prudential information, there is no deposit insurance or government guarantee of banks.  
In the banking sector, there are low levels of active regulation.  New Zealand relies on 
more active interventions being carried out in other jurisdictions where the banks 
operating in New Zealand are domiciled.   
New Zealand’s labour market institutions in combination with its financial market 
institutions have had an impact on physical capital accumulation in New Zealand.   
Institutions in both areas were changed significantly during the 1980s and 1990s.   
Treasury (2004) suggests that New Zealand’s low capital/labour ratio may be due to 
changes in capital and labour regulations leading firms to utilise more labour relative to 
capital. 
The World Bank (2004) gives New Zealand the highest possible rating for its protection of 
creditors in its Doing Business measures and IMD International (2004) ranked New 
Zealand 7
th out of 60 countries in terms of the adequacy of the legal regulation of its 
financial institutions for financial stability.  McMillan (2004) notes that on measures of 
investor protections, New Zealand protects its savers/lenders at least as well as most 
other industrialised countries
18
.   
McMillan notes that promising small firms appear to be able to attract the capital and other 
resources they need to grow in New Zealand.  IMD International ranks New Zealand 11
th 
out of 60 on the availability of access to its capital markets. 
                                                                 
18 McMillan uses an indicator developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shliefer and Vishny that measures the wedge between a 
firm’s cashflow rights and control rights.  The closer the wedge is to zero, the smaller the deviation from the ideal of one-share-one-
vote.  Country averages are 1% in the U.S., 10% in the U.K., 5% in Australia, 8% in N.Z.  He also discusses a summary measure of 
investor protections compiled by the OECD, with a higher number meaning stronger protections.  Scores ranged as follows: U.S. 0.42, 
U.K. 0.86, Australia 0.60, France -0.61, Germany 0.23, New Zealand 0.66.  
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5.3  Land and other natural resources 
The institutions that affect the use of land and other natural resources most are those that 
define property rights over these assets.  Property rights determine the access to and use 
of resources that can be made by individuals or groups.  This includes specification of 
how they may transfer the property rights to others.   
The nature of the property rights related to a particular resource depend on whether 
people can be excluded from using the resource (excludability) and the number of people 
that can use the resource concurrently (rivalness).  Property rights can be broadly 
categorised as private property (generally excludable and rival); common property (group 
members have the right to exclude non-members); public property (owned by all, but with 
access and use controlled by the state); and open access property (where no one has the 
right to exclude anyone). 
Open access property is typically inefficiently over-exploited; a problem termed by Hardin 
(1968) the “tragedy of the commons”.  Without any institutional constraints, a negative 
appropriation externality arises where an individual uses the resource ignores the impact 
on the resource and on others.  The result is a “rush” as individuals compete to 
appropriate the resource before anyone else does.  Institutional responses to the 
overexploitation problem include the development of rules to regulate the capture of the 
resource stock, such as first-come first-served rules to minerals, and rules to regulate the 
capture of flow, such as riparian rights to water, estover (pasture) turbary (peat) and 
piscary (fish).  The development of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) based 
management systems for fish in New Zealand is a response to an overexploitation system 
common in fisheries (Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr 2002). 
Common property institutions typically include rules that prescribe who may use and 
benefit from the resource and what use may be made of the resource.  Alienability is 
typically limited.  Examples include village grazing areas, tribal fishing areas.  In New 
Zealand, many of the resources owned collectively by Māori have common property 
characteristics.  Common property institutions can lead to efficient resource use in some 
circumstances, generally where there are economies of scale in resource use; there are 
low transaction costs in monitoring and enforcement and the economic and social 
environment is stable (Ostrom 1990).   
However, common property can also result in inefficient use (Cheung 1970).  There is the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour by individuals who might, for example sell the 
resource without the consent or knowledge of the other common owners.  Common 
ownership increases the transaction costs of obtaining agreement among owners eg, for 
use or alienation; dilutes the incentives for any individual to husband or invest in the 
resource (others will benefit); discourages uses that may be more valuable but where 
monitoring of inputs and outputs is more difficult; reduces the ability to use the resource 
efficiently eg, to aggregate resources and increases fragmentation of title among 
successors (exacerbating the problem).  Common ownership also reduces the ability to 
use the resource as security ie, it increases borrowing costs (Anderson and Lueck 1992).  
(De Soto 2001) considers that a lack of formal institutions of private property that prevents 
natural and physical capital from being used efficiently is responsible for the lack of 
economic development in many countries of the world.  
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In general, private property rights can be expected to result in efficient and sustainable 
resource use, since owners enjoy both the costs and benefits of their resource use 
decisions.  The maximum economic value can thus be drawn from resources when private 
property rights are clear and well-defined. 
However, private property rights may conflict with the rights of others.  Pollution is the 
classic example of a resource allocation problem that arises because property rights are 
poorly defined.  For example, air pollution arises because there are no clear defined 
property rights to air.  Cars and factories can therefore emit smoke at no cost to 
themselves without regard to the impact on others. 
Creating clearly defined property rights is a “first best” solution to the problem of 
externalities (Coase 1960).  Alternatives include taxation and regulation.  Private property 
rights are thus typically limited in some respect, often by regulation that proscribes use.  
The proscription may be intended to limit or prevent externalities that negatively affect 
others.  While such regulation may be imposed with the objective of fostering the efficient 
use of resources, they can in some cases lead to inefficient resource use.  Heller’s (1998) 
notion of anti-commons describes resources for which multiple parties have the right to 
prevent use or prevent changes in use.  The result is the “tragedy of the anti-commons” 
where the fragmentation of veto rights creates incentives to hold-out and raises the 
transaction costs of agreement about efficient resource use. 
Property rights legislation will contribute most to economic growth where it facilitates the 
use of land and natural resources by those who can use the resources most productively.  
Ideally, institutions will ensure that long term considerations of sustainability are taken into 
account when determining property rights over resources.  Generally, those that value 
resources most are those that can obtain the greatest economic value from them.  Non-
economic factors (eg, cultural and spiritual values) play an important role in the use of 
land and other natural resources, but in order for efficient resource decisions to be made, 
those who enjoy the non-economic aspects of resources should also bear the costs. 
5.3.1  Resource allocation, innovation and human capital  
The quality of property rights around land and natural resources will affect the level of 
investment in such assets.  Effective property rights institutions provide clear guidance on 
what property rights are, how to obtain them and the costs of ignoring them.  Effective 
property rights institutions decrease the cost of sourcing finance for investments in land 
and natural resources as they decrease the uncertainty around the returns of the 
investment.  Clearly defined property rights improve certainty about the returns from 
investment and so improve the value of investing in these resources.  They can also 
reduce the cost of investing, by minimising the cost of obtaining property rights and 
reducing the legal costs incurred in gaining certainty about the validity of property rights.  
Clear property rights therefore improve the ability of firms to expand their productive 
capacity through innovative use of land and natural resources.   
The effect that this has on investment in human and physical capital is uncertain.  Unclear 
property rights could see firms substitute investment in human or physical capital for 
investment in land or natural resources.  However, where firms have clear property rights 
over land, they are likely to also make investments in human and physical capital to 
complement their investments in land.  In general, a firm’s overall productivity is likely to 
be reduced where the quality of its investments in one factor is compromised and it is not 
able to make full use of all its resources.  
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5.3.2  New Zealand natural resource institutions  
The key piece of legislation related to the use of land and natural resources in New 
Zealand is the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA).  The purpose of the RMA as 
specified within the Act is to promote use of natural and physical resources for social, 
economic and cultural wellbeing in a manner that sustains the potential of these resources 
to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations.  The RMA governs the 
use of land (including building on land), water, soil and air.   
Business groups have expressed a number of concerns about the RMA and its impact on 
potential productivity.  They are concerned that the process involved in obtaining resource 
consents under the RMA can be expensive and uncertain in terms of the decisions that 
will be reached about applications and the time involved in processing applications.  They 
suggest that it is also a barrier to infrastructure developments that are essential to 
business, e.g., power generation and transmission, roading and water use.  The 
government is undertaking a review of the RMA to be completed in September 2004, 
considering how to achieve the right balance of national and local interests, improve the 
design and process for local policy formulation, improve the consent decision making 
process, improve mechanisms for deciding who can use natural resources and support 
measures for building capacity and promoting best practice and implementation in local 
authorities.  
A different resource management issue arises from the collective ownership structure of 
Māori land and whether it achieves a balance between protecting land from alienation and 
enabling land to be managed as a commodity for sustainable economic development 
(New Zealand Treasury 2001).  Change to institutions in this area, particularly 
mechanisms for achieving control and financing, could allow greater returns to Māori land 
owners.   
New Zealand’s environmental laws are ranked very poorly in terms of their impact on 
competitiveness by IMD International (2004).  New Zealand is ranked 60
th out of 60 
countries in terms of whether the compliance requirements of environmental laws hinder 
competitiveness.  At the same time, New Zealand is ranked 11
th in assessments of 
whether pollution problems that affect the economy (ie, the impacts of pollution are low 
compared to those of many other countries).  The rankings in the Yearbook are based on 
survey responses rather than actual costs, so they reflect the perceptions of local 
business people rather than the relative level of costs associated with environmental laws 
in New Zealand relative to those in other countries.   
6  Transactions and governance 
Institutions governing product markets and corporate governance influence the nature of 
the markets in which firms buy and sell products.   
6.1 Product  markets 
Product market institutions will influence the establishment of firms by shaping the 
markets within which firms operate.  As such, they determine the scope for transactions to 
take place and the gains that firms can expect to achieve in return for meeting transaction 
costs.  Product market institutions determine who can establish firms and how this must 
be done.  The regulations include processes related to entry to and exit from markets  
WP 04/19  INSTITUTIONS, FIRMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  29  
(e.g., procedures required to start a business and processes for filing for bankruptcy), 
restrictions on firms from entering particular markets (e.g., restricted numbers of licences 
or permits to operate, border controls) and operational requirements on firms (e.g., price 
setting controls).   
Product market regulations affect firm productivity by influencing the level of competition in 
product markets and therefore the pressure to be efficient and innovative.  Product market 
regulations that protect firms from competition encourage inefficient business practices as 
firm survival is not immediately threatened by inefficiency (OECD 2002).  This allows for a 
suboptimal use of factor inputs and affects incentives to innovate and adopt efficient 
production techniques.   
Product market institutions also affect industry productivity by determining the makeup of 
an industry or the market share of market participants.  These institutions increase 
productivity where they encourage greater participation by productive firms and less by 
firms that are not as productive.   
6.1.1 Resource  allocation 
Regulations that restrict entry into a market or limit the number of firms that can operate 
will reduce the number of employers in an industry.  Restrictive product market regulation 
decreases employment as there are fewer firms to hire workers, which strengthens the 
incentives on incumbent workers to seek protection of their jobs (Koeniger and Vindigni 
2003).   
Cross-market influences in labour markets can be generated by uncompetitive institutions 
operating in product markets.  Without competition, firms are able to set prices rather than 
being subject to the price set by the market.  There is less pressure to be cost efficient in 
production as excess costs can be passed on to consumers.  Market restrictions enable 
firms to appropriate excessive profits and workers within the firm will seek a share of 
these profits.  Nickell and Layard (1999) note that union wage mark-ups are higher in 
firms with greater market power.  Unions are able to secure a portion of the higher rents 
achieved by firms protected by product market restrictions.   
Inefficiencies in resource allocation created by uncompetitive markets may be 
exacerbated by any inefficiencies that arise as a result of labour market institutions.  Firms 
will have less flexibility over the use of labour and, facing little pressure to control prices, 
can pass any associated costs on to consumers.   
6.1.2  Innovation and human capital 
Product market institutions have implications for the innovation potential of firms and the 
economy.  Where they generate markets with low levels of competition, there is little 
pressure to innovate to secure greater market share and therefore little incentive to invest 
in human capital as a source of or complement to innovation.  
Even where product market institutions in general create a competitive environment, 
individual institutions can undermine innovative activity.  For example, the absence of 
bankruptcy laws can reduce investments as such laws limit the risks faced by individual 
investors.  Scarpetta et al (2002) suggest the contribution that product market regulations 
make to innovation and technology adoption depends on the conditions they create for the 
birth and expansion of innovating firms as well as for the exit of obsolete ones.   
Restrictions on market entry and exit undermine innovation because they inhibit the  
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dynamism of a market.  Border controls can have a similar effect to domestic market 
controls in terms of market dynamism.  International competition brings further pressure to 
innovate as well as exposure to new knowledge and technologies.   
New firms often bring new ideas and technology and more efficient processes to the 
market.  The effect of regulations on entry are especially important for productivity in 
industries where technology is rapidly evolving, such as information and communication 
technology (ICT) industries or industries that are characterised by high adoption of this 
technology (OECD 2002).  New entrants to these industries play an important role in 
introducing new vintages of technology.  Incumbents usually have a higher opportunity 
cost of adopting potentially superior technologies as the knowledge acquired to master 
the old technology is only partially transferable to the new technology (Bassanini and 
Ernst 2002).   
Product market regulations also include the regulation and protection of intellectual 
property rights.  Clear specification and strong enforcement of intellectual property rights 
support the appropriation of intellectual property by those generating it and thus 
encourage firms to innovate.  If innovations are not appropriable there is little incentive to 
engage in innovative activities.  However, to maximise innovation, intellectual property 
rights need to balance appropriation of benefits by the firms that generated the innovation 
with the possibilities that will arise from applying it to new technology. 
Where a firm’s rents are protected by restrictive product market regulations such as 
restrictions on entry to markets, they will not be driven to innovate even with protection of 
their intellectual property rights (Bassanini and Ernst 2002).  The rents the firms would 
receive from engaging in innovation activities would not be significantly greater than those 
they would receive without the innovation. 
6.1.3  New Zealand product market institutions 
New Zealand has substantially reformed its product market institutions.  The government 
now plays much less of a role in regulating product markets than it has in the past, having 
reduced tariffs and done away with many interventions like subsidies, import licences and 
price controls.
19
  Market regulations now aim to support competition and efficiency in 
market operations.   
Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) included New Zealand among the five countries 
with the least restrictive product market regulatory environments in the OECD, as shown 
in Figure 5. 
                                                                 
19 New Zealand is currently considering what it will do with remaining tariffs after the current freeze on tariff removal ends on 1 July 
2005.  See <http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/tariffs/review/> for more details.  
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Gwartney and Lawson (2004) rate New Zealand 5
th overall in the Economic Freedom of 
the World index in terms of the economic freedom provided in product markets.  This 
includes a ranking of 1
st in terms of price controls (or lack thereof).  IMD International 
(2004) ranks New Zealand 1st in the World Competitiveness Yearbook in terms of price 
controls, protectionism and subsidies not affecting economic activity.   
McMillan (2004) notes that the costs of starting up a business in New Zealand are among 
the lowest in the world and the procedures for registering new firms are streamlined.  IMD 
International (2004) ranks New Zealand 2
nd for the number of days taken to start a 
business.  The World Bank (2004) notes that it is relatively easy to open or close a 
business in New Zealand compared to other countries, with a system that is efficient and 
characterised by low costs and low complexity.  It also notes that New Zealand’s 
insolvency system is very efficient and requires no court involvement.   
6.2 Corporate  governance 
Establishing a firm reduces the informational and contracting costs faced by resource 
owners in the open market.  However, it does not eliminate costs, as the firm structure 
introduces some within-firm information, monitoring and uncertainty costs of its own (i.e., 
agency costs).  Owners cannot be certain that their agents will pursue the objectives they 
wish them to, i.e., profit maximisation.  Saleh notes that bargaining costs will be lower 
within the firm (for example, an employer need not negotiate with employees about 
undertaking specific tasks) but the costs of monitoring employees and obtaining 
information about aspects of the production process are not necessarily insignificant.   
There are a number of mechanisms that can mitigate these costs, including corporate 
governance, the market for corporate control and bankruptcy.  
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There are many conflicts of interest in firms with separation of ownership and control and 
where managers/shareholders are not liable for losses.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) suggest that the legal system itself is a mechanism that allows 
investor rights to be protected.  Furthermore, the legal system has a fundamental impact 
on the structure and functioning of the market which also acts as a discipline on 
managers.   
More formally, the corporate governance system is a mechanism by which shareholders 
provide a discipline on management in order to maximise the value of the firm.  Corporate 
governance mechanisms involve reporting and disclosure on matters related to 
management and board members, such as remuneration and responsibilities, declaration 
of relevant interests, provisions to limit insider trading, risk management processes, audit 
arrangements and relationships with stakeholders.  Corporate governance mechanisms, 
while costly themselves, may reduce the prevailing agency problems and the induced 
agency costs.  In other words, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737), “Corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investments.”   
External agents other than shareholders may also effectively monitor and constrain 
managerial behaviour outside the corporate governance structure, for example through 
the stock market, bankruptcy or regulation. 
The market for corporate control, including takeovers and mergers, also acts as a 
discipline on managers by external agents.  A firm that is not performing up to 
expectations is an attractive target for a takeover.  Where a firm is underperforming, its 
profits will fall and then its share price will fall.  Shareholders will be more open to a 
takeover offer if a company is not performing well.   
The threat of a takeover is a pressure external to the firm that provides a discipline on the 
activities of managers.  The threat of takeover acts as an incentive on managers to 
perform well as management typically lose their jobs after a takeover.  This is true 
whether or not a takeover offer has been made to shareholders because there is always 
the potential for an offer to be made.  The threat of takeover aligns the interests of 
managers and shareholders by encouraging managers to maximise the returns to 
shareholders, which in turn encourages shareholders to resist takeover offers.   
The market for corporate control can be seen as the “glue” that holds together the nexus 
of contracts that is the firm.  When a firm is taken over, parts of the organisation may be 
sold off or established as stand alone entities.  This implies that the agency costs 
associated with retaining resources within the firm had become too high and the new 
owners find it more cost effective to acquire those resources through the open market.   
The degree to which the institutions governing the market for corporate control allow for 
takeover will influence whether the threat of takeover can place an effective discipline on 
management to perform.  Regulation of takeovers and mergers can often focus on equity 
rather than efficiency objectives.  Equity objectives involve the protection of consumers, 
minority shareholders, employees and other stakeholders.  These considerations can 
affect the value of a takeover transaction to the acquirer and therefore reduce the extent 
to which takeovers contribute to improving management performance.   
Other institutions may affect the capacity for changes in corporate governance.  For 
example, competition law may prevent mergers and takeovers where a company is selling 
products in a non-competitive market.  The prospect of corporate control providing greater 
discipline for firms operating in such markets would be particularly valuable, given  
WP 04/19  INSTITUTIONS, FIRMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  33  
management in such firms face less pressure than their counterparts in more competitive 
industries to operate efficiently.  However, mergers or takeovers of these firms is unlikely 
to improve these conditions and if anything will worsen them.  Bittlingmayer (2000) notes 
that during most of the twentieth century, mergers, acquisition and control of corporations 
in the United States have been related to problems of monopoly and concentration of 
economic power. 
6.2.1  Resource allocation, innovation and human capital 
Resource owners will attempt to maximise their productivity and profitability through the 
method of coordinating resources that they adopt, either contracting in the open market or 
using the firm structure.  Which method provides the greatest returns will depend on which 
delivers the greatest efficiencies.  This in turn will depend on the relative imposition of 
transaction costs in the open market compared with the agency costs within the firm.  This 
will be influenced by institutions governing corporate governance and market transactions.   
Effective contracting institutions contribute to economic growth by improving the efficiency 
of transactions.  They reduce the costs to firms of transacting with each other and provide 
an environment where firms can be confident about entering into contracting 
arrangements, undertaking innovations and investing in human and physical capital.   
Effective corporate governance institutions contribute to economic growth by exerting 
discipline on management to maximise profits.  Takeover, or the treat of takeover, can 
increase productivity and profitability if it increases management efficiency in resource 
allocation and encourages managers to look for innovative opportunities.  Bittlingmayer 
(2000) notes that recent studies on firm productivity find that transfers of control over firms 
raise productivity and profits.  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find that corporate 
governance and competition boost productivity growth.  Effective corporate governance 
will encourage investment in human capital where this will enable management to improve 
profitability. 
6.2.2 Productivity 
Corporate governance is increasingly seen as a mechanism that promotes economic 
growth.  However, while the relationship between corporate governance and growth is 
clear in theory, the relationship is difficult to establish empirically at the macroeconomic 
level, partly because the effect is difficult to measure and isolate (OECD 2004).  Laws that 
protect investors differ significantly across countries, in part because of differences in 
legal origins and these differences in laws and their enforcement affect the ownership 
structure, dividend payout, availability and cost of external finance, and market valuations 
of firms (La Porta et al 1998).   
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu  (2001) analyse the impact of corporate governance 
institutions, ownership structures and external capital market constraints on company 
returns on investment and they conclude that differences in firm performance are related 
more to the legal system than the firm’s corporate governance arrangements.
20
  
Companies in countries with legal systems based on the common law earn returns on 
investment that are at least as large as the cost of capital.   
                                                                 
20  Gugler Mueller and Yurtoglu  (2001) use a sample of more than 19,000 firms from 61 countries.  
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Klapper and Love (2002) examined governance arrangements in emerging markets and 
conclude that firm-level corporate governance matters more in countries with weak legal 
environments exhibiting little shareholder protection and poor judicial efficiency.  In other 
words, the legal environment matters less for well-governed firms, which have less need 
to rely on the legal system to resolve governance conflicts. 
At the firm level, the empirical evidence suggests that corporate governance is an 
important determinant of firm performance (see for example Gugler 2001).  La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) find that strong investor protection is 
associated with effective corporate governance, as reflected in valuable and broad 
financial markets, dispersed ownership of shares, and the efficient allocation of capital 
across firms.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) found that firms with strong shareholder 
rights yielded annual returns that were 8.5% higher than those with weak rights.
21
  They 
also showed higher valuations, higher profits, higher sales growth and lower capital 
expenditures. 
The impact of corporate governance on firm performance has been shown in a number of 
studies outside the US.  Denis and McConnell (2003), in a survey of international 
corporate governance, conclude that strong investor protection permits the development 
of strong financial markets necessary for economic growth.  A study of Korean firms 
showed that improving corporate governance practices can have a significant impact on 
the value of a company (Black, Jang and Kim 2003).
22
  Drobetz, Schillhofer and 
Zimmermann (2004), in a study of German firms, found a positive relationship between 
good governance arrangements in firms and firm value.  
6.2.3  New Zealand corporate governance institutions 
The practice of corporate governance is seen to be of a good standard in New Zealand, 
although ongoing consideration is given to how these can be improved to increase the 
information available to owners and the market more generally.  The New Zealand 
Security Commission recently developed a set of principles for corporate governance to 
guide boards of directors related to ethical standards, board composition and 
performance, use of board committees, reporting and disclosure, remuneration of 
directors and executives, risk management, external audit processes, stakeholder 
relations and stakeholder interests.  The New Zealand Stock Exchange recently reviewed 
its legal and regulatory framework to ensure the arrangements balanced the protection of 
market integrity with compliance costs.  As part of upcoming reforms to securities trading 
law, changes will be considered for provisions related to insider trading, market 
manipulation, disclosure and penalties. 
                                                                 
21 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use a time series study of 1,500 US firms in the 1990s 
22 This study is based on an index including shareholder rights, board of directors in general, outside directors, audit committee and 
internal auditor, disclosure to investors, and ownership parity.  It showed that improving the index by 10 points results in a 5% increase 
in Tobin’s q—the ratio of market value to book value of assets  
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7 Conclusions 
Institutions affect the use firms make of human capital.  They do so by influencing the 
resources that firms use and the innovations they undertake in their quest for greater 
productivity and thereby their need for human capital.  Greater use of human capital can 
increase efficiency of resource use through improving labour productivity, which can lead 
to greater firm productivity.  Human capital is also an important component of innovation 
and assists in the uptake of technology.  Depending on whether or not institutions are 
efficiency enhancing in their nature, they will either lead firms to make full use of human 
capital or discourage firms from doing so.   
Optimising the contribution of human capital to productivity requires a broad perspective 
on the institutions that can influence human capital formation and application.  The most 
important institutions for economic growth are those underlying institutions that provide 
the broad environment for economic activity, especially those related to property rights 
and contract enforcement.  These give firms the confidence to engage in production and 
exchange by reducing their uncertainty about whether they will receive the fruits of their 
economic activity.  Such confidence provides a basis on which firms are willing to make 
long term investments, including investments in human capital. 
Institutions that govern specific activities in the production and exchange of output will 
have impacts on economic activity that are more limited in scope, but still important.   
Where institutions lead to increased production and exchange they generate economic 
growth.  Activity-specific institutions affect the efficiency of resource allocation within firms 
and transactions between firms.  Institutions governing labour markets, financial markets 
and use of land and other natural resources will influence the extent to which firms can 
utilise these factors efficiently and innovatively.  Institutions governing product markets 
and corporate governance will influence the pressures on firms to do so.  Both the extent 
to which firms can utilise factors efficiently and innovatively and the pressure to do so will 
drive firm use of and investment in human capital.   
Labour market institutions, particularly those related to job protection and collective 
bargaining, are likely to be significant in terms of their impact on the investment and use of 
human capital and on the levels of productivity achieved by firms.  Their impact will 
depend on how the institutions affect the relationship between workers and employers and 
whether improvements they bring to the quality of labour’s input increase productivity 
more or less than the degree to which they increase the cost and inflexibility of labour.  
The characteristics of institutions that enhance productive relationships between firms and 
workers is worth further exploration.  
Institutions governing other factors of production will also influence the use of human 
capital.  Financial market institutions that improve confidence in the soundness of the 
financial market will enhance the availability of finance to firms.  This supports investment 
in physical capital and complementary investments in human capital, leading to increases 
in labour productivity and thereby higher firm productivity.  Property rights particular to the 
use of land and natural resources influence the use that firms make of such resources 
and, depending on the confidence that firms have of gaining the returns from investments 
in natural resources, they could either substitute investment in human or physical capital 
for investment in resources or they may make complementary investments.  To achieve 
greatest economic growth, property rights and financial market institutions would allow for 
the greatest potential utilisation of these factors of production.    
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Institutions related to transactions between firms influence the pressures on firms to be 
productive and to undertake innovations.  Product market institutions that create 
competitive markets place pressure on firms to be efficient and innovative to maintain or 
increase market share.  Corporate governance arrangements provide a discipline on firm 
management to maximise profits.  Both types of institutions provide incentives to invest in 
human capital where it contributes to efficiency and innovation.   
All of these activity-specific institutions can affect firm decisions in areas outside their 
domain.  By way of example, labour market institutions can influence firm decisions about 
the use of capital where the relative impact of labour market and financial market 
institutions result in capital being more flexible, available and/or cost effective than labour.  
When new institutions are introduced, they can have consequences in other areas that 
may be unintended and may undermine productivity.  Before introducing new institutions, 
assessment needs to be made of the cross-market impact of institutional changes in one 
area for resource use in other areas.  
7.1  New Zealand’s institutions: areas for further work 
Overall, underlying institutions can be seen to have the most significant effect on 
economic growth because of the context that they provide for economic activity to flourish.  
In New Zealand, in many regards our underlying institutions provide an excellent 
environment for economic activity.  One New Zealand institution that is the subject of 
ongoing public debate is the Treaty of Waitangi.  The evolution of interpretations of the 
Treaty will have ongoing implications for economic growth given its bearing on property 
rights, resource use and social cohesion in New Zealand.  Useful work could be 
undertaken to strengthen Māori social capability and governance (New Zealand Treasury 
2001) and, among other things, align such work with the intended outcomes of the Treaty 
settlement process. 
New Zealand’s activity-specific institutions are also generally sound.  However, there are 
some areas where they might be given further attention.  Labour market institutions and 
the contribution that they can make to increases in productivity through improved 
relationships between employers and workers is an area that could usefully be further 
explored.  Assessment of the impact on economic growth of the Employment Relations 
Act and recent amendments on the Act would be useful, once the provisions have been in 
place for a length of time, e.g. five years.  Useful work exploring the implications for 
economic growth of New Zealand’s financial market institutions and property rights over 
natural resources is already underway, although further consideration could be given to 
how institutions could be changed to unlock the productive potential of multiply owned 
Māori land.  New Zealand’s corporate governance and product market institutions are 
generally very efficient.  Further work is underway to further strengthen corporate 
governance institutions and to consider future tariff levels.   
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